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Isaiah Berlin has not attracted much attention from academic strategists. This is 
unfortunate, because his concept of value pluralism helps explain why strategic 
decisions are burdened by uncertainty. It also highlights the importance of political 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategists might be forgiven for wondering why Isaiah Berlin, that genial champion of 
political liberalism who abhorred physical violence, is relevant to their concerns. Of 
course the practical contributions of Oxford dons to national security have been many 
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and varied, and Berlin was no exception in this regard. During the Second World War 
he was posted to Washington, from which vantage point he kept his superiors well-
briefed on developments in the US political scene. Here, however, I am less interested 
in Berlin’s war record than in the relevance of his intellectual concerns to questions of 
strategy. This happens to be considerable although not widely recognized. Lawrence 
Freedman has noted the pertinence of Berlin’s views on political judgement to matters 
of strategic deliberation.1 Nevertheless, there remains more to be said in this respect. 
More specifically I propose to demonstrate: a) that Berlin’s notion of political judgement 
is part of a broader intellectual vision that relates the concrete specifics of strategic 
practice to their underlying social contexts; and b) that the political utility of strategic 
decisions rests on how well these contexts are understood. To this end I provide an 
account of Berlin’s views on history and politics, with particular reference to his concept 
of value pluralism. I then recruit Clausewitz in order to clarify how value pluralism 
burdens strategic deliberation with uncertainty, and how political judgement can 
ameliorate the resulting problems. Because concrete details are central to such matters, 
I subsequently discuss some important historical instances of the role played by political 
judgement in shaping strategy. These examples are not intended to reveal anything 
empirically new. Rather, their purpose is to illuminate the manner in which political 
judgement influences decisions about the scale and scope of military effort. Finally, I 





1. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. 613-4. 
Additionally, some aspects of this present article are more briefly sketched out in John Stone, 
Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).  
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BERLIN AND VALUE PLURALISM 
Berlin (1909-97) was born in Riga, which was then part of the Russian Empire.2 In the 
wake of the Revolution his family emigrated to England, which provided him with a 
congenial new home. As an undergraduate he went up to Oxford where he subsequently 
spent the rest of his academic life. He initially taught analytic philosophy but, on 
returning after the war, focused more on the history of ideas. That said, Berlin is difficult 
to pigeonhole. His interests included politics, ethics and music; he was reluctant to 
describe himself as a historian, and the influence of his philosophical views remained 
readily apparent in his other pursuits. This eclecticism, compounded with Berlin’s 
suspicion of organized systems of thought, left scope for questioning the defining 
character of his contribution to intellectual life.3 Today he is probably best known for 
his distinction between positive and negative liberty, and for his division of people into 
hedgehogs (who view the world through the lens of a single organizing idea) and foxes 
(who perceive matters in terms of many unrelated facts). As will become clear, however, 
these are elements of a wider intellectual effort to defend a role for freedom and choice 
in human affairs against the manifold influence of monism. 
     Berlin’s views on these issues were underpinned by what John Gray terms his value 
pluralism, and the radical challenge it poses to the prescriptive status of political 
philosophy.4 According to Berlin this status is predicated on 
 
2. Berlin’s long and interesting times are documented in Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1998). 
3. Indeed the fact that Berlin never produced a major work of synthesis led some to question his 
intellectual significance. Such doubts have since been dispelled, not least by Henry Hardy’s 
edited collections of Berlin’s essays. In what follows I have drawn on: Henry Hardy, ed., The Sense 
of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996) [hereafter SR]; 
Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, eds, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays 
(London: Pimlico, 1998) [hereafter PSM]; Henry Hardy, ed., Against the Current: Essays in the 
History of Ideas (Princeton University Press, 2013) [hereafter AC].           
4. John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (London: HarperCollins, 1995).  
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the conviction that there exist true, immutable, universal, timeless, objective 
values, valid for all men, everywhere, at all times; that these values are at least in 
principle realisable, whether or not human beings are, or have been, or ever will 
be, capable of realising them on earth; that these values form a coherent system, 
a harmony which, conceived in social terms, constitutes the perfect state of 
society…5 
This conviction implies a commitment to rationalism, to the assumption that a perfect 
society is (again if only in principle) attainable via the exercise of reason. Someone of 
sufficient intellectual stature should, in other words, be able to resolve the apparent 
tensions we routinely discern between values such as freedom and equality, or justice 
and mercy, thereby reducing them to some harmonious whole. Indeed, Berlin claimed 
that just such a monist conception of the good had always been the ultimate goal of 
Western philosophy.6 
     The significance of Berlin’s value pluralism lies in its rejection of such rationalist 
assumptions. In this he was influenced by many different sources. From Machiavelli 
came the insight that different moralities are not reconcilable—that the pagan values of 
Republican Rome were incompatible with Christian values, and that those aspiring to 
temporal power had consequently to privilege political glory in this life over spiritual 
salvation in the next.7 Berlin was likewise impressed by Giambattista Vico’s point that 
past civilizations have bequeathed us great achievements we cannot hope to emulate. 
This is because our worldviews are so dissimilar that, despite our own impressive 
scientific and technological accomplishments, we could not today create anything like 
 
5. “Vico and the Ideal of Enlightenment”, AC, 152.   
6. “The Pursuit of the Ideal”, PSM, 6. 
7. “The Originality of Machiavelli”, PSM, 269-325.  
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the Iliad or Odyssey. Consequently there can be no common basis for comparisons 
between our respective achievements. 8  And from Herder came the Romantic 
movement’s assertion that cultural particularism is constitutive of human flourishing, 
that the Enlightenment emphasis on remaking society along rational lines dooms 
humankind to an impoverishing, deracinated existence.9 
     All this led Berlin to conclude that ultimate values, though finite in number, are very 
diverse and cannot necessarily be reconciled with each other. Consequently the tensions 
we have always perceived between them are not only artefacts of our intellectual 
shortcomings: they are also symptomatic of radical incompatibilities that admit of no 
rational solution. Reason may serve to hone our appreciation of these incompatibilities, 
and the dilemmas they create for us, but it cannot otherwise help us resolve them. There 
is, in other words, no exclusively best way of living awaiting our discovery.10 To claim 
otherwise—to base society on some monistic conception of the good—would be to deny 
the legitimacy of alternative views.11 Indeed, monism can all too readily inspire utopian 
visions demanding the suppression of dissent amongst those who cannot appreciate 
what is best for them. These become the totalitarian projects of Berlin’s hedgehogs: of 
Robespierre, Hitler, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “who relate everything to a single, 
universal, organising principle … a fanatical, unitary inner vision” providing a 
procrustean standard against which to measure all thought and action.12 
 
8. “Vico and the Ideal of Enlightenment”, 151-63;   
9. “Herder and the Enlightenment”, PSM, 359-435.  
10. “The Pursuit of the Ideal”, 1-16.  
11. “Two Concepts of Liberty”, PSM, 191-242.  
12. PSM, 436-7. “Trust us to lead because we know what is better for you and the umma” is a 
popular refrain within jihadi circles according to Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad 
Went Global, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38.   
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     Here it might be observed that, in attempting to save us from totalitarianism, Berlin 
acceded to an alternative tragedy: a world characterized by unavoidable disagreement 
and conflict over values. In such a world we would have to accept that reason could 
provide no safeguard against war, and that some wars would be terrible indeed if fought 
between societies whose lack of common values precluded mutual understanding. 
Berlin believed that such outcomes were unlikely, however. He considered that the 
number of fundamental values is finite, and that the manner of their combination is 
what is unique to any particular society. Moreover, even when confronted with values 
that we do not share, we can nevertheless appreciate the role they play in shaping the 
deliberations of others. Condemnation does not preclude comprehension. Indeed, 
people “of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand … the values, 
the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society, even those remote in space and 
time”.13  
 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL JUDGEMENT 
Berlin was confident in his claims for imaginative insight because he considered it 
something that competent historians routinely employ in their efforts to re-create the 
past. History requires such efforts because its unfolding reflects the unique 
combinations of values held by those who enact it. In this respect his views on history, 
as on society, were predicated on his pluralism. Just as we should not expect reason to 
resolve the tensions between inherently incompatible values, he maintained, nor should 
we expect it to discern meaningful regularities within the flow of historical events. He 
therefore rejected the view that historians should aspire to the status of scientists. Their 
 
13. “The Pursuit of the Ideal”, 9. See also Ramin Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin 
(London: Peter Halban, 1992), 36-7. 
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task could not be to identify reductive correlations between data points, because the 
significance of such points depends on the unique constellation of values associated 
with the society under consideration. Consequently any such internal world of values 
cannot be analysed effectively from the outside, and attempts to do so will inevitably fall 
into anachronism. Instead, historians must enter this internal world by imaginatively 
reconstructing it; for only then can they appreciate the historical significance of the data 
under consideration.14 
     But although historical events defy reduction to some universal objective pattern, nor 
are they entirely random. As Berlin noted, we typically perceive them as constituents of 
some larger stream that flows in a particular direction; we allow that certain things could 
only have happened at certain points in that stream and not others; we look back at 
utopian schemes, realizable only through impossible efforts to defy the realities of their 
day, and we distinguish such schemes from those that succeeded because of astute 
accommodation with the tide of events. In re-creating the past, therefore, historians 
must strike a balance between two equally unsatisfactory extremes: they must avoid 
overly reductive generalizations, just as they must avoid interpreting their data without 
regard to the constraints of context. 
Historians [wrote Berlin] cannot ply their trade without a considerable capacity 
for thinking in general terms; but they need, in addition, peculiar attributes of 
their own: a capacity for integration, for perceiving qualitative similarities and 
differences, a sense of the unique fashion in which various factors combine in the 
particular concrete situation, which must at once be neither so unlike any other 
situation as to constitute a total break with the continuous flow of human 
 
14.  “The Concept of Scientific History”, PSM, 17-58. 
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experience, nor yet so stylised and uniform as to be the obvious creature of theory 
and not made of flesh and blood.15 
It was this sense of the plausible that Berlin termed historical judgement. 
     Berlin’s account of history is incompatible with claims that it provides a repository of 
timeless lessons for those possessing the key to unlock them. There could be no such 
key, because there is no genuinely universal history. However, he did observe that 
historical judgement has an instrumental counterpart in the realm of politics, that 
successful statecraft rests on sound political judgement. In this respect the difference 
between historical and political judgement is one of temporal orientation and purpose. 
Whereas historians seek to understand the past for understanding’s sake, statesmen 
seek to understand the present for the purposes of shaping the future. Both, however, 
are operating on their data in a similar manner. Much like its historical counterpart, 
political judgement involves 
a capacity for integrating a vast amalgam of constantly changing, multicoloured, 
evanescent, perpetually overlapping data, too many, too swift, too intermingled 
to be caught and pinned down and labelled like so many individual butterflies. To 
integrate in this sense is to see the data … as elements in a single pattern, with 
their implications, to see them as symptoms of past and future possibilities, to see 
them pragmatically—that is, in terms of what you or others can or will do to them, 
and what they can and will do to others or to you.16 
This capacity, moreover, works without recourse to the strictures and limitations of 
formal intellectual systems. Instead it is common sense developed to some 
 
15.  Ibid., 56.  
16. “Political Judgement”, SR, 46.  
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conspicuously high degree, although it might sometimes manifest as uncanny luck.17 In 
this way are those gifted with sound judgement able to navigate successfully amongst 
the flow of events, and even shape them when it seems feasible and desirable to do so. 
 
STRATEGY 
How, then, is the foregoing relevant to the concerns of strategists? The answer depends, 
of course, on what we consider strategy to be, and there is room for interpretation in 
this respect. What follows, therefore, is based on the view that strategy provides the link 
between military means and political ends; that it is concerned with the use of armed 
force to achieve intended political effects. This is a mainstream understanding of 
strategy.18 Moreover, it is one that permits the role played by political judgement in its 
operation to be specified with the help of Clausewitz. 
     According to Clausewitz, wars are fought between belligerents that are each seeking 
to achieve their political goals at least probable cost. From a military perspective, this 
situation pushes both sides into extreme efforts intended to minimize the threat posed 
by their enemy. Absent other considerations, this will involve each side seeking to 
destroy the other’s armed forces as rapidly as possible, by means of the most powerful 
blows they can manage. Settling for some lesser effort would serve only to increase the 
risk of disarmament by an enemy that observes no comparable restraint. That said, it is 
frequently the case that both sides would prefer to restrict the scale and scope of their 
military efforts, and resolve their differences at some lower level of violence. Wars in 
which both sides endeavour to disarm each other typically involve much costly fighting. 
 
17.  “The Sense of Reality”, SR, 25; “Political Judgement”, 53. 
18. For variations on this theme see: Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity, 
2015), 21; B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 
335; Peter Paret, “Introduction”, in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
Age, ed. Peter Paret (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 3. 
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Thus, unless the belligerents attach extraordinary importance to achieving their political 
goals, they will likely find that the costs of war outweigh the benefits. In the case of wars 
fought over relatively modest political differences, therefore, each side will wish to 
restrain its own efforts, and will be correspondingly alert to signs that its adversary does 
too. Consequently such wars are often fought to a partial military conclusion within the 
context of mutually observed limitations on the use of force. This indeed is what 
Clausewitz had in mind when he characterized war as a continuation of politics. It is not 
simply that war proceeds from political differences, but that the values attached to these 
differences constrain its conduct by setting limits on what each side is willing to 
sacrifice.19 
     Fundamentally, therefore, strategy involves striking a balance between the military 
and political imperatives of war. One must venture enough to avoid military defeat, but 
not so much that the costs of fighting outweigh the political benefits of victory.20 This, 
however, can become very difficult once theoretical generalities give way to concrete 
instances of war—and the reasons for this are readily explicable in terms of Berlin’s value 
pluralism. Because each war arises from unique political circumstances, strategists must 
look to the specifics of each case in order to establish how much scope they possess for 
departing from their maximum military effort. Following Berlin, there can be no 
mechanical procedure for doing this, no algorithm with which to manipulate the 
relevant data, even if what count as relevant data could be unequivocally established. 
This is because the questions strategists must answer relate to an enemy’s intentions, to 
what he is proposing to do with his armed forces. These intentions are governed by his 
 
19. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Halweg, 19th ed. (Bonn: Dümmler, 1980), 191-
213. 
20. Ibid, 347. 
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resolve, by the costs and risks he is willing to bear in pursuit of his political goals. And 
his resolve depends, in its turn, on the extent to which his political goals embody his 
ultimate values. Moreover, the unique constellation of competing values that finds its 
expression in any given society will not be fully appreciated by its own members, let 
alone their adversaries in other societies. A specific political dispute will harness some 
combination of these values to the conduct of war, galvanizing resolve in each 
belligerent that the other cannot readily anticipate. It is therefore necessary for 
strategists on both sides to assemble pertinent insights from the wealth of 
accompanying data that is potentially relevant to the specific situation; to discern 
amongst it an underlying pattern that discloses something of an enemy’s intentions and 
their likely interactions with their own. Clausewitz was alluding to the same matters 
when he noted that 
the first, the greatest, the most decisive act of judgement that the statesman and 
commander perform is that of correctly recognizing, in this respect, the war on 
which they are embarking. They must neither mistake it for something, nor wish 
to change it into something, that is contrary to the nature of its circumstances. 
This is, then, the first and most comprehensive of all strategic questions … 21 
Here Berlin might have added that this question cannot be definitively answered, that 
one must continually return to it in the light of changing circumstances. 
   
BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 
Because Berlin’s understanding of judgement is associated with the ability to integrate 
specific details under concrete circumstances, historical illustrations provide a valuable 
 
21. Ibid., 212. 
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way of illuminating its relationship with strategy. Consequently, I now turn to the 
influence of Otto von Bismarck over Prussian strategy during the wars of German 
unification. The choice is not an arbitrary one: Berlin considered Prussia’s prime 
minister to be the consummate political actor—“perhaps the most effective of all 
nineteenth-century statesmen.” 22  And this, he considered, was because Bismarck 
possessed a striking ability to construct accurate political assessments from a 
multiplicity of relevant data. From a strategic perspective this ability proved particularly 
important, because it furnished him with a sound understanding of the wars he required 
Prussia to fight, and what this implied for the conduct of military operations. 
     Bismarck was that contradictory thing: a conservative revolutionary. His principal 
goal was to preserve the Hohenzollern dynasty from the threat posed by liberal 
nationalism in mid-century Germany. His bold solution lay not in seeking to suppress 
nationalist sentiment, but in appropriating it to the conservative cause. This he sought 
to achieve by placing Wilhelm I of Prussia at the head of a new Reich assembled from 
the existing collection of German states.23 In this respect the challenge facing Bismarck 
was to generate the national sentiment necessary for German unification, whilst 
neutralizing sources of resistance to this goal. His ultimate success in this endeavour 
stemmed from his ability to navigate a path to unification amongst the complex political 
realities of his day. 
     According to Berlin, Bismarck’s grasp of these realities did not result from privileged 
access to some timeless laws of political life; he did not view the world in accordance 
with some objective standard of rationality.24 To be sure, he appreciated certain general 
 
22. “Political Judgement”, 49.  
23. For a recent overview of Bismarck’s career see Edgar Feuchtwanger, Bismarck: A Political 
History, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2014). 
24. “The Sense of Reality”, SR, 37. 
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propositions about the political climate of his times: he knew his project would 
inevitably provoke resistance from other European powers, and that Prussia therefore 
needed the military strength necessary to impose its will as required. This was partly a 
technical challenge for the army, but in an age of mass politics it also involved creating 
popular support for military initiatives. It was evident to Bismarck 
that the only way to fight power is by power: and power in the modern world 
requires the organisation of as many human beings as is practicable, and the 
employment by them or on their behalf of the only instruments capable of 
crushing resistance—political and military measures. If the institutions and the 
force of the enemy were to be overcome, it could be done only by the conquest of 
political power; the enemy could be finally crushed only by an act of coercion, by 
revolution.25 
But in addition to this general sense of nineteenth-century political realities, Bismarck 
enjoyed a penetrating insight into relevant specifics. At each step of the way he 
appreciated enough of the concrete circumstances confronting him to intuit what 
needed to be done, and how he might achieve it. And although Bismarck was not 
infallible in such matters, his strategic prescriptions did offer better prospects for 
political success than the formulaic alternatives presented by the military.  
     For its part the Prussian army was both an immense help and a considerable 
hindrance to Bismarck. At its head stood the highly talented Helmuth von Moltke, who 
was perhaps the best general of his age. He did, however, hold decidedly fixed views 
about the relationship between war and politics, which resulted in an inflexible 
conception of strategy. Moltke had risen to power amongst senior officers who had 
 
25. “Marxism in the Nineteenth Century”, SR, 134.  
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experienced disaster at the hands of Napoleon I. In 1806 the Emperor of the French had 
effectively crushed Prussian military resistance at Jena. In the ensuing peace Prussia lost 
half its territory, and narrowly avoided complete dismemberment. As the army 
reconstituted itself in the wake of defeat, it determined never to fall victim to another 
such disaster and assiduously prepared to inflict something similar on its future enemies 
instead. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Moltke’s appreciation of strategy faithfully 
echoed these sentiments. Although he declared himself intellectually indebted to 
Clausewitz, and acknowledged that war proceeds from political differences between 
states, Moltke insisted that the goal of military operations should always be the 
destruction of the enemy army through battle.26 His conception of strategy was, in other 
words, much narrower than the interplay of military and political imperatives that had 
concerned Clausewitz. 
     Thus whatever Moltke’s professional qualifications for high command, he was 
working on a smaller canvas than Bismarck, whose concerns lay with the wider political 
consequences of military action. In the event, therefore, these two different perspectives 
collided during Prussia’s wars with Austria and France. Indeed, in each case, Bismarck 
faced a Clausewitzian moment—one in which the formulation of sound strategy 
demanded the subordination of military imperatives to contrary political 
considerations.   
     In the first instance Bismarck precipitated war with Austria in order to humble 
Vienna, thereby excluding her from political developments in the rest of Germany. He 
 
26. See his 1871 essay “Ueber Strategie” in Moltkes Militärische Werke 2/2 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried 
Mittler und Sohn, 1900) 291-3. Also: Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the 
Rise of the General Staff”, in Paret, ed., 281-95; Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and 
the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment”, in Paret, ed., 296-325; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the 
Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Volume I: The Prussian Tradition 1740-1890, trans. 
Heinz Norden (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), 194-206.  
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also reckoned on making territorial gains in northern Germany that would furnish 
Prussia with several million new subjects. As for Austria itself, however, he determined 
against annexations in an effort to keep hostilities brief, and mend relations as soon as 
possible thereafter. 
     On 3 July 1866 Moltke hammered the Austrian army at Königgrätz and sent it reeling 
back on Vienna.27 True to his doctrines, he next intended a swift follow-up calculated to 
destroy the remaining Austrian forces before they regained their balance. Any delay, he 
reasoned, would introduce unnecessary risks into a currently favourable military 
situation.28  At this point, however, political considerations intruded in the form of 
Napoleon III, who stepped into the fray with an offer to broker peace between Berlin 
and Vienna.29  This was not something to be lightly dismissed, because any affront to 
the emperor’s honour risked war with France whilst the Prussian army was yet 
committed in Bohemia. 
     Thus Bismarck now faced a dilemma. Moltke remained sanguine at the prospect of a 
two-front war, but the prime minister had no wish to see Vienna and Paris become allies 
in consequence—not least because he was planning to fight France in the foreseeable 
future. An armistice was therefore desirable sooner rather than later. Nevertheless, it 
was risky to suspend military operations in the absence of prior French acquiescence in 
Bismarck’s political goals with respect to Austria. If subsequent negotiations failed to 
 
27. For details see Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1965). 
28. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), 198, 202. 
29. Otto Fürst von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Zweiter Band (Stuttgart: Verlag der J. 
G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1898), 57.  
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deliver on these, hostilities would have to be renewed under less favourable military 
conditions.30 What, then, was to be done? 
     In the event Bismarck guessed that Napoleon would ultimately consent to his 
relatively modest terms for peace with Austria, and trusted that diplomacy would deliver 
them in due course.31 Meanwhile he set himself to resisting the army’s plans for an 
immediate renewal of offensive operations. This required a sustained effort on his part, 
not least because the king proved sympathetic to the army’s position. Wilhelm was now 
beguiled by the prospect of extensive territorial gains, and therefore looked favourably 
on a continuation of hostilities. It was not until the night of 11/12 July that Bismarck 
finally received the diplomatic assurances he required from Paris and Vienna. 32 
Thereafter he had still to fight his corner in the Prussian councils of war, but could do 
so with greater authority. What was required, in terms of Austrian concessions for his 
German project, could now be had without further recourse to war. Why then press for 
more, when doing so would jeopardize everything? Persuading the king proved difficult, 
and Bismarck prevailed only after the intervention of the Crown Prince. But Wilhelm 
did ultimately agree to his prime minister’s wishes, concluding that if 
a heavy war indemnity from Austria or an acquisition of land sufficient to impress 
the eye … cannot be obtained from the vanquished without endangering our 
principal objective [i.e. unification], then the victor at the gates of Vienna must 
bite into this sour apple and leave to posterity the judgement of its behaviour.33    
 
30. Craig, Politics, 201-02.  
31. Ibid., 199, 201, 203. 
32. Bismarck, 66.  
33. Cited in Craig, Politics, 203. Bismarck (p. 71) remembered the wording differently, but did not 
have the relevant document to hand when writing his memoirs.  
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Bismarck’s political instincts had in fact proved sound. He had correctly anticipated the 
mood in Paris and Vienna, and had therefore been justified in resisting calls for renewed 
military action in favour of negotiations. Despite Wilhelm’s misgivings, therefore, the 
judgement of posterity ultimately favoured his prime minister’s management of events. 
     Bismarck did later provoke war with France, but under more auspicious 
circumstances. He appreciated that Napoleon would not willingly tolerate a powerful 
new empire on his eastern border, and must therefore be allowed no choice in the 
matter. Hence the Franco-Prussian War, which commenced on 19 July 1870.34 Hostilities 
began with a dramatic series of frontier battles orchestrated by Moltke, by means of 
which he destroyed the French army and bottled up its remnants in the fortified city of 
Metz. Napoleon was also captured in the process, and by early September Bismarck was 
seemingly in sight of realizing his new Reich. 
     Then matters went awry. The collapse of the regular French army heralded a new 
phase of the war, characterized by revolution in Paris and the emergence of a national 
government determined to prolong hostilities by means of popular resistance. 
Replacement forces were hastily assembled in the French interior, and franc tireurs 
began operating in occupied territory. What was supposed to be a short sharp war now 
threatened to become a struggle of indefinite duration and unpredictable consequences, 
as new political energies were unleashed. It was against this alarming background that 
Moltke and Bismarck fell out. Each entertained very different views about how best to 
terminate the war, and the significance of Paris to this process. 
     The French capital would henceforth play a central role in the war’s outcome. Its 
symbolic importance effectively bound the new national government to its fate, even as 
 
34. For details see: Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961); 
Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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Moltke invested it in mid-September. Consequently it acted as a beacon for replacement 
French forces, which were tasked with raising the siege. For his part Moltke remained 
true to form. He was determined to strike down all opposition until the French people 
finally acknowledged defeat.35 He sought to destroy their new provincial forces in the 
field, and answered irregular resistance with harsh reprisals. All the while he grew 
exasperated with a foe that remained as stubborn as it did militarily ineffective, 
evidently failing to realize that the French need only endure in order to create political 
problems for Prussia.36  At any event, Moltke’s plans for winning the war required him 
to re-deploy the troops investing Paris, and he therefore wished to ensure that the city’s 
substantial French garrison would not subsequently become a threat. Consequently he 
stipulated that any terms for the surrender of the capital include its occupation under 
martial law, along with the disarmament of its garrison troops and their imprisonment 
in Germany.37 
     Bismarck, on the other hand, considered that more conciliatory terms offered a better 
chance of achieving an armistice before events span further out of control. He did not 
relish the prospect of prolonged fighting in the French interior because it offered no 
political benefits whilst creating new risks. There was no longer any real prospect of 
Moltke’s forces suffering a major defeat. Still, the chance remained that some local 
reversal of fortunes would stiffen French resolve and improve their negotiating position. 
Moreover, further delays in securing peace threatened to rob Bismarck’s wider project 
 
35. Craig, Politics, 208. 
36. Moltke’s anger at the continuation of French resistance is evident in his correspondence with 
his brother Adolf. See Letters of Field-Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke to His Mother and His 
Brothers, trans. Clara Bell and Henry W. Fischer (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1892), 190–211. 
37. Craig, Politics, 211-2; Howard, Franco-Prussian War, 436. 
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of its political momentum, and increased the risks of intervention by other powers.38 
Thus, whereas Moltke cared little for French pride, and viewed the fate of Paris as but 
one link in a purely military chain of events, Bismarck now saw the city as key to a 
political end to the war. He therefore had no wish to impose terms on the French capital 
that were likely to be viewed as unduly draconian or humiliating. And this, in turn, 
meant that he could not allow Moltke’s purely military imperatives to drive strategy at 
this point.  
     In due course Moltke and Bismarck took their respective cases to the king for a 
decision. This time around, Wilhelm sided with his prime minister in a notably decisive 
manner. Not only did he stipulate that Bismarck would be the one to negotiate an 
armistice, but he also ordered a dismayed Moltke to consult the prime minister on the 
matter of any future military operations.39 This opened the way for Bismarck to present 
more modest demands on Paris, which precluded its military occupation or the 
imprisonment of its garrison, so as to avoid further antagonizing the French.40 His more 
accommodating approach proved successful, and shortly thereafter an armistice was 
agreed, whose scope was subsequently enlarged to encompass the whole of a war-weary 
France. As for Wilhelm, he was declared Emperor at Versailles on 18 January 1871—the 
beneficiary of a surge in German nationalism stirred up by the war.  
     What, then, would Berlin have made of these matters? He would likely have viewed 
them as disputes between a military hedgehog and political fox. For all his undoubted 
talent, Moltke was basically a military technician. Everything he thought and did was 
subordinated to a single overriding principle—the efficient destruction of the enemy’s 
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armed forces—without serious regard to its political consequences. Politics was 
something for others to worry about once he had crushed the opposition. Bismarck, on 
the other hand, was a decidedly vulpine statesman who looked out over wider vistas. 
For him, military matters were but one consideration amongst others, all of which 
required a degree of mutual accommodation were his political goals to be realized. “In 
particular”, he noted, “judging when the right moment has arrived, for initiating the 
transition from war to peace, requires knowledge of the European situation that is not 
necessarily familiar to the military, and information that cannot be accessible to it.”41  
     Not only did Bismarck, by dint of his office, have access to such knowledge and 
information, but he was especially adept at interpreting it. According to Berlin, he was 
endowed with the “power of integrating or synthesising the fleeting, broken, infinitely 
various wisps and fragments that make up life”. Consequently he “understood the 
potential reactions of relevant bodies of Germans or Frenchmen or Italians or Russians”, 
and could therefore correctly anticipate how events would unfold. 42  All successful 
statesmen, claimed Berlin, are capable of something like this, but Bismarck managed it 
“over a much larger field, against a wider horizon of possible courses of action, with far 
greater power—to a degree, in fact, which is quite correctly described as that of 
genius.”43 Bismarck, in other words, possessed excellent political judgement, and was 
thereby able to exercise a highly beneficial influence over Prussian strategy. 
 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND IRAQ 
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With the foregoing comments in mind, it is interesting to consider what Berlin would 
have made of recent US adventures in the Middle East. We can, of course, only speculate 
in this regard. Still, it seems likely that he would have looked to the fundamental 
assumptions that set the terms of strategic engagement in the War on Terror; and there 
he would have found something very different from the astute sense of the plausible 
that had governed Bismarck’s efforts. In its place he would have discovered an uncritical 
belief in a deterministic account of historical progress that blinkered policy and strategy 
towards Iraq. This account depicted the twin doctrines of political and economic 
liberalism as inevitable victors over contrary ideological positions. Having emerged 
triumphant from the Cold War, they were now expected to deliver a bright future for all 
those willing and able to embrace them. During the 2000 presidential race, George W. 
Bush’s soon-to-be national security adviser was clear on these matters. Condoleezza 
Rice conjured visions of an increasingly globalized world that was resolutely marching 
“towards markets and democracy”, thereby benefitting the United States and its allies 
who were “on the right side of history” in this respect.44 Bush himself subsequently 
claimed that the ideological conflicts of the previous century had “ended with a decisive 
victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: 
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise”.45 
     There is an echo of Francis Fukuyama’s claims for the end of Hegelian history here, 
although not a particularly faithful one. Fukuyama was at pains to deny simplistic links 
between his world-historical thesis and the more quotidian round of foreign-policy 
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concerns that would likely demand Washington’s attention after the Cold War.46 That 
political and economic freedoms were prevailing at a global level did not necessarily 
mean that local obstacles to their realization would prove insignificant in the meantime. 
Uncritical belief in the redemptive qualities of markets and democracy was not, 
therefore, a self-evidently sound basis for policy and strategy in the wake of al-Qaeda’s 
attacks on the United States. It yet needed to be alloyed with an accurate grasp of local 
specifics. 
     In the near term, US forces struck back hard at al-Qaeda in order to blunt its capacity 
for further mischief. Still, such actions were viewed as addressing the symptoms of a 
deeper problem whose resolution required more ambitious solutions. More specifically, 
the ultimate eradication of militant jihadism was considered to require wider efforts, 
calculated to ameliorate the sources of popular discontent on which it evidently thrived. 
The Bush administration believed that this discontent stemmed from the failure of 
authoritarian regimes to provide their citizens with political representation and access 
to the global economy. This was hardly an original diagnosis. New, however, was a 
willingness to employ force in order to sweep away barriers to social justice in the 
Middle East. And it was in this context that Washington determined to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq. Doing so was expected to free Iraqi citizens to embrace 
democracy and markets, in the process galvanizing similar events in neighbouring states 
and transforming the region’s political and economic climate.47 That the likes of al-
Qaeda would lose traction under these conditions was but one desirable outcome of 
such events.  
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     This was an ambitious project that attracted its fair share of critics.48 For present 
purposes the relevant point of contention was intimately bound up with Clausewitz’s 
“decisive act of judgement that the statesman and commander perform”, which is to 
appreciate the kind of war they are proposing to fight. And on this matter US politicians 
and generals disagreed. Disarming Saddam was a necessary precondition for removing 
him from power. The real question was whether the war’s character would be defined 
by this task alone, or also by the requirement to maintain political stability thereafter. 
This was because the answer would determine the scale and scope of the military effort 
required. 
     The Bush administration was confident that a limited military commitment would 
suffice. It anticipated a short war, followed by a smooth political transition that would 
keep existing state institutions in place. “The idea that it’s going to be a long, long, long 
battle of some kind I think is belied by the fact of what happened in 1990”49 claimed 
defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, evidently comparing the liberation of Kuwait with 
regime change in Iraq. The military was therefore directed to plan for a modest 
deployment, calculated to destroy Iraq’s indifferent armed forces prior to withdrawing 
as soon as possible thereafter. For their part, the generals took a more cautious line. 
There were concerns about how stable a post-Saddam Iraq would really be, and whether 
substantially larger US forces might not be required to preserve order in the war’s 
aftermath. 50  The details were necessarily thrashed out behind closed doors. 
Nevertheless, an indication of the different viewpoints emerged in February 2003 when 
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the US Army’s chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, informed the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” would 
likely be required to maintain stability and manage potential ethnic tensions following 
the invasion of Iraq. This soon drew a response from deputy defence secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz, who dismissed such notions as “wildly off the mark.” It was difficult, he 
continued, “to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-
Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of 
Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.”51 
     One reason the administration found such an outcome unlikely was its assumption 
that US efforts to remake Iraq would have history on their side, and could therefore be 
expected to succeed with relative ease. Given the choice, Iraqi citizens would readily 
embrace the blessings of liberal capitalism because markets and democracy enjoy 
universal validity—and consequently their virtues must necessarily be self-evident to 
anyone capable of rational deliberation. Bush exemplified this way of thinking when he 
claimed that “[m]oral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place” 
and that markets and democracy are “right and true for every person in every society”.52 
The key thing, therefore, was to remove the barriers preventing Iraqis from acting in 
accordance with the dictates of reason. As Toby Dodge observed, when Bush “talked 
about his ‘inviolate … faith in the transformative power of freedom’, he was referring to 
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the power of individuals once liberated from oppressive regimes to use their 
rationality.” 53  Consequently, in the case of Iraq, it would suffice merely to depose 
Saddam, whereupon Homo Economicus would step up and take over.54 
     Here, in other words, Berlin would likely have detected the influence of monism at 
play. Iraq would be the latest step in a determinate historical process, leading to the 
ultimate triumph of liberal capitalism founded on the free expression of universal 
reason. And yet, behind all the confident assertions of a single route to human 
flourishing lay an erinaceous neglect of local values and circumstances. To the likes of 
Bush it might seem obvious that Iraq’s redemption lay in its citizens’ obedience to the 
dictates of market and ballot-box. But could this be true of a state where economic 
opportunity had hitherto turned on loyalty to Saddam, and where democracy would 
now empower the previously downtrodden Shia majority at the expense of a privileged 
Sunni minority? How smoothly could the transition to self-rule really be expected to 
proceed under circumstances in which Iraq’s traditional power structure would be 
turned on its head? For their part, regional experts and other academics warned that the 
risk of events escaping control and spiralling into violence were considerable. 55 
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However, the Bush administration’s hedgehogs continued operating in what Fred 
Kaplan described as a “fog of moral clarity”.56 
     In the event, this moral clarity was no match for recalcitrant facts on the ground, 
which quickly asserted their authority as the civil fabric fell apart. The fall of Baghdad 
triggered wide-spread looting that available US forces were too few to control. The 
deteriorating situation called to mind a more pessimistic political tradition than that 
prevalent within the White House. This much the British civil servant Emma Sky 
discovered, after setting out to explore the newly liberated city. There she encountered 
a disgruntled Iraqi who succinctly summarized the new reality for her. “This is a 
Hobbesian world … Hobbes, Hobbes” he declared.57 People were not, in other words, 
adjusting to the power vacuum by spontaneously embracing the norms of market 
behaviour. Rather, they were responding to the collapse of central authority by pre-
emptively acquiring whatever resources remained available.  
     Viewed from this darker perspective, the prospects for stability in post-Saddam Iraq 
depended on the presence of more coercive power than the United States could readily 
bring to bear, because the requisite troops were not available in theatre. At this juncture, 
any action that further reduced the means available for maintaining order might 
therefore be described as fanciful. And yet the first official acts of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority effectively did just this. Ba’athists were peremptorily removed 
from senior positions in the state bureaucracy, and the rump Iraqi army was 
disbanded.58 The belief that such initiatives would further reduce obstacles to Iraqi 
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citizens acting in accordance with the universal dictates of rationality seemingly 
remained strong in the face of growing evidence to the contrary.59  Meanwhile, the 
conflict quickly escalated as other actors were pulled, or jumped, into the fray with 
consequences that soon mocked the optimistic assumptions of the Bush administration, 
and that are still being felt today. 
     The decision to keep force levels low, and subsequently to dismantle key elements of 
the Iraqi state, were, in other words, responses to two important Clausewitzian 
moments faced by the Bush administration. They each required an accurate assessment 
of the type of war Iraq’s would-be liberators should expect to fight. This, in turn, 
required the kind of judgement that Bismarck had so conspicuously possessed. There 
was a need to look beyond global trends, to perceive the data relevant to specific local 
circumstances, and to synthesize them into a faithful and coherent picture of matters 
on the ground. But whereas Bismarck had managed such challenges readily enough, the 
Bush administration did not do so.60 For his part, Berlin would most likely have put this 
down to a surfeit of utopian thought, predicated on a simplistic interpretation of history.      
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Berlin is relevant to the concerns of strategists for two key reasons. One of these relates 
to his conception of history, which maintains a significant place for choice—and hence 
for politics and strategy—in human affairs. History’s course is not readily set by a human 
hand on the tiller; indeed it can sometimes defy the most heroic of wills. But this 
defiance cannot be explained in terms of deterministic forces that necessarily deny 
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choice. Human agency is not confined within boundaries defined by some rationally 
discernible summum bonum. If the currents of history prove difficult to defy, it is not 
(or at least not exclusively) the result of impersonal forces. Local contingency is also 
important in this respect. This is why historical judgement resides in the ability to re-
create the past without recourse to overly reductive generalizations on the one hand, 
but with regard to the constraints of local context on the other. It is also why political 
judgement involves an appreciation of the general trend of events, combined with a 
sensitivity to concrete details of time and place. If politics is the art of the possible, then 
sound political judgement helps clarify exactly what the possible encompasses.  
     In the context of strategy, political judgement helps establish what the resort to force 
makes feasible, and at what costs and risks. In other words, the exercise of sound 
judgement makes strategy a genuinely political activity, as opposed to a purely military 
exercise in the efficient application of force. It is a difficult business, but Bismarck’s 
exploits illustrate what is possible in this respect. His appreciation of political realities 
encouraged him to restrain Moltke, whose purely military view of strategy might 
otherwise have embroiled Prussia in larger and more intractable wars than were 
necessary for the purpose of German unification. In contrast, the Bush administration’s 
efforts were a signal failure in 2003 partly because ideological certainty crowded out 
political judgement. There was a failure to appreciate the centrifugal political forces that 
removing Saddam would likely unleash, and the US military commitment was therefore 
kept too small to cope with the problems it subsequently faced. 
     Finally, the Janus-faced relationship between historical and political judgement 
provides direction for strategists intent on honing their sense of the plausible. Although 
strategy involves looking forwards into the future, it suggests that strategists should also 
spend a good deal of time and effort looking backwards into the past. This is not because 
history provides a universal road-map that can be rationally extrapolated into the future; 
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nor because it can be made to yield “lessons learned” of ubiquitous relevance. At least 
in Berlin’s conception of it, history furnishes nothing reliable along these lines. Rather 
it is because plausible historical accounts of what previously occurred in certain specific 
contexts may hint, in however oblique and qualified a manner, at the possibilities for 
gainful action in today’s version of those contexts. 
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